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SUPREME COURT—OCTOBER TERM 2009 
FOREWORD: CONSERVATIVE JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
 Over twenty years ago, my Foreword on the Supreme Court’s 
October 1988 Term titled The Vanishing Constitution discussed how 
the conservative majority on the Court emphasized deference to 
majoritarianism. Momentous decisions that term included ones that 
upheld the death penalty for juveniles and the mentally retarded, 
allowed random drug testing for government employees, permitted 
greater government regulation of abortion, and significantly narrowed 
the availability of habeas corpus in federal courts. Over the last two 
decades, the Supreme Court has become significantly more 
conservative, but the conservatism of October Term 2009 differs from 
that of October Term 1988. The latter emphasized great deference to 
the decisions of the elected branches of government, but the current 
conservatism shows little such deference, especially when deference 
conflicts with the conservative judicial ideology. 
 Today’s Court—the Roberts Court—is a conservative, activist 
Court. I think that the three most important decisions from October 
Term 2009 were Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
which found a First Amendment right of corporations to spend 
unlimited amounts of money in elections; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 
which held that the Second Amendment applies to state and local 
governments; and Berghuis v. Thompkins, which is the most significant 
limit on Miranda rights since that case came down in 1966. In this 
Foreword, I examine these three cases to establish my central point: we 
are at a time of significant conservative judicial activism; the Court has 
replaced the deference of twenty years ago with a very different brand 
of judicial conservatism.  
 
 * Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of 
Law.  
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Over twenty years ago, I was asked to write a Foreword on the 
Supreme Court’s October 1988 Term.1 I titled the article The 
Vanishing Constitution. The central thesis was that the conservative 
majority on the Court was emphasizing deference to majoritarianism, 
which meant that less and less of the Constitution was being 
enforced. October Term 1988 was particularly momentous2 as the 
Court upheld the death penalty for juveniles and the mentally 
retarded,3 allowed random drug testing for government employees,4 
permitted greater government regulation of abortion,5 and 
significantly narrowed the availability of habeas corpus in federal 
courts.6 
In 5–4 decisions, the majorities generally consisted of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
White. The dissents were composed of Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens.7 
Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court has become 
significantly more conservative. The most dramatic change was 
Thurgood Marshall being replaced by Clarence Thomas in 1991; one 
of the most liberal justices in recent history was replaced by one of 
the most conservative.8 The most significant change in terms of 
altering results was Samuel Alito replacing Sandra Day O’Connor in 
 
 1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 44 
(1989). 
 2. The term was the focus of a fascinating account written by Edward P. Lazarus, a law 
clerk for Justice Blackmun, titled CLOSED CHAMBERS. 
 3. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 492 (1989) (allowing capital punishment of the 
mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (allowing capital punishment 
of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds). 
 4. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding 
random drug testing for customs service employees). 
 5. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520–22 (1989) (upholding a statute 
that restricted the availability of abortions in public health facilities). 
 6. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (holding that federal courts may not 
recognize a “new right” in habeas corpus unless it is a right that would apply retroactively). 
 7. For example, in Webster, which was one of the highest-profile cases of the term whereby 
the court upheld a Missouri law regulating abortions, this was exactly the split among the justices, 
though the Court had  no majority opinion. Webster, 492 U.S. at 496. 
 8. See SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE 
THOMAS 29 (1999) (quoting Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Chief Justice of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan, “[I]t is indisputable that the fundamental philosophies of 
Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas are diametrically opposed”). 
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2006.9 Thomas and Alito join with Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy to comprise the most 
conservative foursome on the Court since the mid-1930s. Although 
Justice Kennedy sometimes joins the more liberal bloc, much more 
often than not he is with the conservatives.10 Last year, there were 
nine 5–4 decisions in which the Court split along ideological lines, 
with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on 
one side, and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor on 
the other.11 Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives in six out of 
the nine and with the liberals in three.12 The year before, there were 
sixteen 5–4 decisions in which the justices split along ideological 
 
 9. Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; The Most Conservative Court in Decades, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1 (“[T]he data show that only one recent replacement altered [the 
Court’s] direction, that of Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006, 
pulling the court to the right.”); see also NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN AND FAMILIES, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, TIPPING THE BALANCE: THE RECORD OF SAMUEL ALITO AND WHAT’S 
AT STAKE FOR WOMEN (2005), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/ 
AlitoExecutiveSummaryDec20.pdf?docID=999 (“Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s retirement 
threatens to alter the balance on the U.S. Supreme Court and undermine years of progress on 
women’s rights, civil rights and the right to privacy. . . . Judge Alito would turn the Supreme 
Court sharply to the right, and vote to reverse crucial gains from recent years. From protections 
against discrimination such as sexual and racial harassment, to a woman’s right to make her own 
reproductive health decisions, to accountability if states violate the Family & Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA), Judge Alito’s appointment would put the rights and liberties of women, working people, 
minorities and families at grave risk.”). 
 10. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 782–83 (2009) (providing data indicating that in 
nonunanimous cases through the 2006 Term, Justice Kennedy cast a conservative vote 64.7 
percent of the time; using the same metric, the study ranked Justice Kennedy as the tenth most 
conservative of the forty-three justices who served on the Court from the 1937 to 2006 Terms). 
 11. Memorandum re: End of Term Statistical Analysis—October Term 2009, 
SCOTUSBLOG.COM (July 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/07/ 
Final-Stats-OT09-070710_visual-5-41.pdf. Two 5–3 decisions split along ideological lines, with 
Justice Sotomayor recusing herself: Stolt-Neilson, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 
S. Ct. 1758 (2010) and Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010). Id. SCOTUSblog 
“regard[s] these two cases as 5–4 decisions because it seems very likely that had all Justices 
participated, the vote would have split that way.” Id. The nine 5–4 cases are: Sears v. Upton, 130 
S. Ct. 3259 (2010); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Free Enterprise Fund 
v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010); Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); 
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010); and Wellons v. Hall, 130 S. Ct. 727 
(2010). Id. 
 12. The six cases are: McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010); Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010); and Perdue v. 
Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010). 
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lines.13 Justice Kennedy sided with the conservatives in eleven of 
sixteen.14 
The conservatism of October Term 2009 differs from that of 
October Term 1988. The latter emphasized great deference to the 
decisions of the elected branches of government,15 but the current 
conservatism shows little such deference, especially when deference 
conflicts with the conservative judicial ideology.16 
I always have been skeptical of the phrase “judicial activism” 
and have long thought that it is simply a label for decisions with 
which one disagrees. But one can use the conservative justices’ 
definition of judicial activism to see how much the Roberts Court is a 
conservative, activist Court.17 Justice Scalia, for example, has 
indicated that the Court is activist when it overrules elected 
branches’ decisions and restrained when it upholds them.18 It is 
restrained when it follows precedent and activist when it overrules it. 
It is restrained when it rules narrowly and activist when it rules 
broadly. 
By this definition, Brown v. Board of Education19 was very 
much an activist decision: it struck down laws existing in many 
states, it overruled precedent, and it broadly ruled that separate can 
never be equal when it comes to public schools.20 “Activism” thus 
can be good or bad, though it is used rhetorically in a manner that 
implies that it is undesirable. The 2008 Republican platform 
 
 13. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP & SCOTUSblog.com, Memorandum, End of 
Term Statistical Analysis—October Term 2008, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (June 30, 2009), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/summary-memo-final.pdf. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 48–49. 
 16. For a detailed analysis of Supreme Court deference to agency statutory interpretation, 
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083 
(2008). 
 17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 18. See David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional Comparativist . . . 
Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1263 (2007) (“Justice Scalia argues, given democratic 
commitments to legitimacy and collective will formation, it is improper for judges to usurp the 
political authority of the elected branches to resolve normative contests.” (citing Antonin Scalia, 
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in 
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 9–14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
 19. 37 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. See id. at 488, 490–92, 495. 
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declares: “Judicial activism is a grave threat to the rule of law 
because unaccountable federal judges are usurping democracy, 
ignoring the Constitution and its separation of powers, and imposing 
their personal opinions upon the public. This must stop.”21 
The great irony of this statement is that the activism of today on 
the Supreme Court is very much from the right. Conservatives 
continue to attack liberal judicial activism even when conservatives 
are solidly in control of the Supreme Court and they are the 
activists.22 
This was evident in October Term 2009. I think that the three 
most important decisions were Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission,23 which found a First Amendment right of corporations 
to spend unlimited amounts of money in elections24; McDonald v. 
City of Chicago,25 which held that the Second Amendment applies to 
state and local governments26; and Berghuis v. Thompkins,27 which is 
the most significant limit on Miranda rights since that case came 
down in 1966.28 
In this Foreword, I examine these three cases to establish my 
central point: we are at a time of significant conservative judicial 
activism; the Court has replaced the deference of twenty years ago 
with a very different brand of judicial conservatism. I then conclude 
by offering some thoughts as to why this has occurred. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that every decision of the 
Roberts Court is conservative or activist. There were notable losses 
for conservatives in October Term 2009.29 But it is a mistake to treat 
 
 21. Republican Nat’l Comm., 2008 REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, http://www.gop.com/ 
2008Platform/GovernmentReform.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2011). 
 22. See Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial Responsibility: A Tale 
of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 717 (2009) (“If judicial activism is defined as the 
Court overturning the acts of the elected branches and the States, as well as reversing its own 
precedent, then Justices Scalia and Thomas are just as activist as their more liberal colleagues.”). 
 23. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 900. 
 25. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 26. Id. at 3024. 
 27. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 2263; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 29. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2977, 2989 (2010) 
(holding 5–4 that a public university law school could have an all-comers policy and exclude a 
Christian Legal Society chapter that discriminated based on religion and sexual orientation). 
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every case as if it is equally important. Few would deny that these 
three cases were at least among the most important of the term, if 
not, as I believe, the most important cases. Each was a 5–4 decision 
with conservatives in the majority and each must be understood as 
conservatives following their conservative ideology to a conservative 
result. 
I.  CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
provision of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Finance 
Reform Act of 2002.30 The provision prohibited corporations and 
unions from using their funds for broadcast advertisements for or 
against an identifiable candidate thirty days before a primary or sixty 
days before a general election.31 
The Supreme Court had upheld this provision in McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission32 in 2003. The Court also previously 
had upheld state laws limiting corporate spending in election 
campaigns in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.33 In 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Austin and 
partially overruled McConnell.34 
Citizens United arose out of a conservative political-action 
corporation making a video-on-demand movie very critical of then-
Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.35 The issue came 
to the Supreme Court the year before as to whether the McCain-
Feingold Act provision limiting broadcast advertisements by 
corporations applied to video-on-demand.36 Rather than deciding this 
issue, on June 29, 2009, the Court asked for new briefing as to 
whether the provision should be declared unconstitutional and 
whether McConnell and Austin should be overruled.37 
In a 5–4 decision, the Court did exactly that.38 The Court broadly 
 
 30. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884–86. 
 31. Id. at 887. 
 32. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 33. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 34. 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
 35. Id. at 887. 
 36. Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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held that corporations have the same First Amendment rights as 
individuals39 and that restrictions on corporate spending in election 
campaigns are unconstitutional.40 The Court focused only on 
“independent expenditures” by corporations, the corporations’ ability 
to spend money on their own in election campaigns. The 
constitutionality of restrictions on corporate contributions to 
candidates was not before the Court. The Court upheld the provisions 
requiring disclosures of corporate spending.41 
The Court split along ideological lines, with Justice Kennedy 
writing for the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent, 
vehemently disagreeing with every aspect of the majority opinion.42 
What is this decision likely to mean for the future? The 
implications of the case, on many different levels, are likely to be 
enormous. 
First, in holding that corporations can spend unlimited amounts 
of money in election campaigns, the Court has likely changed the 
nature of federal, state, and local elections across the country. This, 
of course, does not mean that corporations will spend large amounts 
in every election or that such spending always will be decisive. But 
corporations (and unions) sometimes will spend greatly in some 
elections and such spending can make a huge difference. 
It is important to remember that corporations and unions could 
spend money in election campaigns prior to Citizens United.43 They 
needed to create Political Action Committees to do so and to raise 
money for them.44 Citizens United is key in that it holds that 
corporations and unions can spend money directly from their 
treasuries to get candidates elected or defeated.45 
One effect of the decision that has not yet been analyzed is in 
judicial elections. In thirty-nine states, judges face some form of 
 
 39. See id. at 900. 
 40. See id. at 913. 
 41. Id. at 913–14. 
 42. Id. at 929–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 43. Id. at 887 (majority opinion). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 913. 
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electoral accountability.46 The costs of such elections already have 
escalated tremendously in many states.47 Corporate spending will 
mean further dramatic increases in spending. 
The issue will arise with increasing frequency as to when such 
corporate spending requires a judge’s disqualification. The year 
before, in Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.,48 the Court held that due 
process required the recusal of a West Virginia Supreme Court 
justice after the officials of a company with a case before that court 
had spent $3 million to get him elected. It really was John Grisham’s 
novel The Appeal49 come to life. Such challenges will become far 
more common as corporations with cases pending before courts can 
spend unlimited sums to have judges elected or defeated. 
Corporations and unions now must engage in a perverse guessing 
game: they need to spend enough to get their candidates elected but 
not so much as to require recusal if their campaigns succeed. Since 
the Court has not yet defined the line at which recusal is required, it 
really is a guessing game for corporate and union officials. 
Second, campaign finance laws other than those about 
disclosure requirements seem very vulnerable after Citizens United. 
The Supreme Court’s decision rested on two key premises: spending 
money in election campaigns is political speech under the First 
Amendment, and corporations have the same free speech rights as 
citizens. 
But these assumptions and the Court’s holding in Citizens 
United can be used to challenge other campaign finance laws. 
Although the Court dealt only with corporate spending, the decision 
 
 46. David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial Performance Evaluations to Enhance Judicial 
Accountability, Judicial Independence, and Public Trust, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 115, 126 (2008) 
(“In thirty-nine states, judges are theoretically held accountable by the public through either 
contested elections or retention elections.” (citing Rachel Caufield, In the Wake of White: How 
States Are Responding to Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections 
Are Changing, 38 AKRON L. REV. 625, 629 (2005)); see also American Judicature Society, 
Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) 
(providing a map of the states with each state’s methods of judicial selection). 
 47. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589, 1603 
(2009) (“Between 1990 and 2004, average campaign spending in nonpartisan elections increased 
by 100 percent, from approximately $300,000 to $600,000. Average spending in partisan 
elections during this period increased from approximately $425,000 to $1.5 million, an increase 
of over 250 percent.” (citation omitted)). 
 48. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). 
 49. JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008). 
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surely applies to union expenditures as well. More dramatically for 
the future, federal law long has prohibited corporations and unions 
from contributing money directly to candidates for federal elective 
office.50 Many state and local governments have similar restrictions 
for their elections.51 As mentioned above, Citizens United concerned 
only independent expenditures by corporations and not their right to 
make contributions directly.52 
But it is hard to see a basis for a distinction once it is held that 
corporations are entitled to the same free speech rights as citizens 
and this includes spending money to influence elections. The Court 
also did not consider the constitutionality of restrictions on campaign 
spending by foreign corporations.53 A distinction seems difficult 
because foreign corporations, like American ones, have the capacity 
to inform the public and to increase discussion and debate. 
In fact, the Court in Citizens United implicitly rejected any 
notion that free speech is limited to citizens.54 Corporations 
obviously are not citizens. Yet, they are accorded First Amendment 
protection in Citizens United.55 But this is in marked tension with 
earlier cases that held that the First Amendment protects only speech 
by citizens. Just four years ago, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,56 the 
Supreme Court held that there is no First Amendment protection for 
the speech of government employees on the job in the scope of their 
duties.57 As was the case in Citizens United, the opinion was written 
by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
 
 50. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2010, at A1 (“The majority opinion did not disturb bans on direct contributions to candidates.”); 
Supreme Court OKs Corporate Campaign Contributions, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june10/supremecourt_01-21.html (“But today’s 
decision did leave in place other restrictions, including a century-old ban on donations by 
companies directly to candidates for federal office. Direct contributions from political action 
committees created by corporations, unions and individuals will still be allowed.”). 
 51. Fredreka Schouten & Joan Biskupic, It’s a New Era for Campaign Spending; High 
Court Rejects Limits on Well Funded Backers, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2010, at 1A (“Twenty-four 
states have similar laws prohibiting or restricting corporate spending in state candidate 
elections.”). 
 52. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010); see also Liptak, supra note 50. 
 53. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. 
 54. Id. at 886. 
 55. Id. 
 56. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 57. Id. at 426. 
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Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.58 Justice Kennedy stressed that 
such speech by government employees is not protected because it is 
not speech in their capacity as “citizens.”59 He wrote: “We hold that 
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First 
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”60 
But if corporations have First Amendment rights, then it makes 
no sense to limit free speech protection to expression by citizens. 
Indeed, the claim for free speech protection by government 
employees is even stronger than that for corporations; government 
employees do not relinquish their citizenship when they enter the 
workplace. 
The Court’s decision certainly opens the question of whether 
any campaign finance laws other than disclosure requirements are 
likely to stand. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have 
previously argued that contribution limits violate the First 
Amendment.61 Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, declared: “I 
would reject the framework established by Buckley v. Valeo . . . . 
Instead, I begin with the premise that there is no constitutionally 
significant difference between campaign contributions and 
expenditures: [b]oth forms of speech are central to the First 
Amendment.’’62 Citizens United certainly provides a basis for 
inferring that there are now five justices who share this view of 
campaign finance law. 
Third, the case has important implications for the role of 
precedent in constitutional decision-making in the Roberts Court. In 
Citizens United, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Austin  and 
partially overruled McConnell, two decisions that had upheld the 
constitutionality of government restrictions on corporate spending in 
election campaigns: McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and 
 
 58. Id. at 412. 
 59. Id. at 420–21. 
 60. Id. at 421. 
 61. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 626–27, 631–34 
(1996). 
 62. Id. at 631, 640 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
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Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.63 
In fact, in McConnell the Court had upheld the constitutionality 
of the same provision that Citizens United invalidated.64 What 
changed in the intervening seven years? Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, who had been part of the majority to uphold the 
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act provision, was replaced 
by Justice Samuel Alito, who voted to strike it down.65 
In a concurring opinion in Citizens United, Chief Justice John 
Roberts said that the Court should overrule the earlier decisions 
because they were “erroneous.”66 But what made them erroneous was 
simply that a majority of the current Court disagreed with the prior 
rulings. During their confirmation hearings, John Roberts and 
Samuel Alito talked a great deal about “precedent” and “super 
precedent.”67 It is clear now that was empty rhetoric. The Roberts 
Court obviously gives little weight to precedent, as evidenced last 
term by decisions overruling prior rulings in changing the standards 
for pleading in federal court,68 in creating major new exceptions to 
the exclusionary rule,69 and in limiting the protections of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.70 Not coincidentally, each of these 
decisions overruling prior decisions was 5–4, with the same five 
conservative justices in the majority. 
Finally, Citizens United should put to rest the constant 
conservative attack on judicial activism. By any measure, Citizens 
United was stunning in its judicial activism. The deference to the 
democratic process so often preached by conservatives in attacking 
liberal rulings protecting rights was nowhere in evidence as the 
conservative majority struck down restrictions on corporate spending 
that have existed for decades.71 
 
 63. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct 876, 912 (2010). 
 64. Id. at 913. 
 65. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 94 (2003); see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 886. 
 66. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 920 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 67. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1204–05, 1217 
(2006). 
 68. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 69. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 70. See Montejo v. Lousiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009). 
 71. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, was decided in 1990, 
remaining valid law for twenty years before the Citizens United decision overruled it. 
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The Court could have ruled narrowly on the issue before it, 
whether the McCain-Feingold Act provision applied to the medium 
of video-on-demand.72 But instead it reached out on its own to ask 
for briefing and argument as to whether the earlier decisions should 
be overruled and then did so.73 
Conservatives have lambasted prior decisions protecting rights 
not stated in the Constitution or intended by its Framers.74 But there 
is no evidence that the First Amendment’s drafters contemplated 
spending money in election campaigns as a form of protected speech. 
Nor did they intend the First Amendment, or any part of the Bill of 
Rights, to protect corporations. It was not until 1978, in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,75 that the Court first found any 
First Amendment protection for speech by corporations.76 Only by 
stating the First Amendment right at a fairly high level of abstraction 
can Justice Scalia justify the protection of corporate spending under 
an originalist philosophy.77 But once originalism is about the abstract 
understanding of a provision, rather than its specific intentions, 
anything can be justified under the Constitution.78 At an abstract 
level, the Framers intended to advance liberty and equality and 
virtually any decision can be justified in these terms. 
Few Supreme Court decisions are more important on as many 
different levels as Citizens United. It likely will change elections 
across the country. It portends even greater changes in campaign 
finance in the years ahead as other laws are now far more vulnerable 
to challenge. It also is very revealing about the Roberts Court and its 
views about precedent and constitutional interpretation. 
II.  MCDONALD V. CITY OF CHICAGO 
Another major decision of the term was McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,79 in which the Court held that the Second Amendment is 
 
 72. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 889–90. 
 73. Id. at 888, 913. 
 74. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989). 
 75. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 76. Id. at 795. 
 77. 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring) (defending First Amendment protection for 
corporations on originalist grounds). 
 78. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
 79. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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incorporated and applies to state and local governments.80 From 
1791, when the Second Amendment was adopted, until 2008, the 
Court never found any law to violate this provision.81 In the handful 
of Second Amendment cases over the course of American history, 
the Court viewed the Second Amendment as protecting a right to 
have guns for the purpose of militia service.82 But in 2008, in District 
of Columbia v. Heller,83 the Court held that the Second Amendment 
is not limited to this and ruled that it protects a right to have guns for 
personal safety, especially in the home.84 The District of Columbia, 
of course, is a part of the federal government so the Court had no 
occasion to consider whether the Second Amendment applies to state 
and local governments. 
Two years later, in McDonald, the Court by the same 5–4 
margin as in Heller, held that the Second Amendment is incorporated 
into the Fourteenth Amendment.85 Justice Alito’s plurality opinion, 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, did 
so through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment’, 
while Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, used the 
privileges or immunities clause.86 
The Second Amendment has enigmatic language. It says: “A 
well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed.”87 One way to interpret it is that it protects a right of 
individuals to have guns for the purpose of militia service.88 An 
alternative interpretation would be that it is about the right of 
individuals to have firearms, even apart from militia service.89 
Throughout American history, the Court chose the former 
 
 80. Id. at 3024. 
 81. District of Columbia v. Heller was the first time the Supreme Court found that a law 
violated the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 82. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 83. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 84. Id. at 634. 
 85. The same five justices were in the majority, but Justice Souter, who had dissented, was 
replaced by Justice Sotomayor, who dissented in McDonald. 130 S. Ct. at 3020. 
 86. Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 88. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3056. 
 89. Id. 
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interpretation.90 It seems most consistent with the text’s statement of 
the purpose for possessing guns; otherwise the amendment is the 
same as if it just said “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms 
shall not be infringed.” In Heller, Justice Scalia said that the first half 
of the Second Amendment is “prefatory” language and the second 
half is “operative” language.91 But there is no reason why the ’entire 
text of the Second Amendment should not be regarded as “operative” 
language. Also, the original version of the Second Amendment 
drafted by James Madison had an exemption from militia service for 
conscientious objectors, obviously a strong indication that the 
provision was about militia service.92 Besides, every time the 
Supreme Court had interpreted the Second Amendment it had said 
that it was solely about a right to have guns for militia service.93 
I am not sure when it was that views on guns came to so track 
ideology, with liberals favoring gun control and conservatives 
favoring gun rights. But that is the social reality and it explains the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald. What is striking 
about these decisions is their activism. Conservatives who have so 
long preached the need for judicial restraint and deference to the 
democratic process showed no hesitation in striking down these 
laws.94 Conservatives who for the last several decades have taken a 
narrow approach to individual liberties and refused to recognize new 
rights had no difficulty in finding a Second Amendment right of 
individuals to have handguns.95 Quite powerfully, in separate articles, 
conservative federal court of appeals judges Richard Posner and J. 
Harvie Wilkinson criticized the Heller decision precisely for its 
judicial activism.96 
 
 90. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 91. 554 U.S. at 577 (“The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its 
prefatory clause and its operative clause.”). 
 92. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 656 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 93. Robert Barnes, Justices Reject D.C. Ban on Handgun Ownership; 5–4 Rulings Finds 
1976 Law Incompatible with Second Amendment, WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at A01. 
 94. Justice Scalia drafted the majority opinions in both Heller and McDonald. See J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Role of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254, 
264 (2009). 
 95. See id. at 264–65. 
 96. Id. at 254; Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun 
Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 35 (“If constitutional decisions are to be 
determined by the balance between liberals and conservatives on the Supreme Court, the fig-
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At the very least, one would expect that a Court committed to 
judicial restraint would have used the ambiguity inherent to the 
Second Amendment to interpret it to defer to the political process 
and to follow precedent. Nowhere did Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion mention the need for judicial deference to the democratic 
process that is so characteristic of his opinions when he sides with 
the government in cases involving other individual liberties.97 Nor, of 
course, was there any deference to precedent. 
The cases left open many questions concerning when and under 
what circumstances the government may regulate firearms. Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court in Heller, was clear that it is not an 
absolute right.98 He said, for example, that the government can 
regulate where people have guns, such as by preventing guns in 
schools or government buildings.99 He said that the government can 
keep those with a history of serious mental illness or a prior felony 
conviction from having firearms.100 The Court, though, did not 
indicate the level of scrutiny to be used for this right.101 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the majority stated: “Under any of the standards of 
scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, 
banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation to 
“keep” and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail 
constitutional muster.”102 
This seems clearly wrong, for as Justice Breyer wrote in a 
dissent, the District of Columbia law at least met rational basis 
review.103 Studies indicate that gun laws decrease gun violence and 
however much those studies are in dispute, they are enough to meet 
rational basis review.104 Justice Breyer explained: 
[T]he District’s decision represents the kind of empirically 
 
leafing that we find in Heller—the historicizing glaze on personal values and policy 
preferences—will continue to be irresistibly tempting to the justices, with their large and tireless 
staffs and their commitment to a mystique of ‘objective’ interpretation.”). 
 97. See Wilkinson, supra note 94, at 256. 
 98. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595, 626 (2008). 
 99. Id. at 626. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 634. 
 102. Id. at 628–29. 
 103. See id. at 687–88. 
 104. See id. at 704–05. 
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based judgment that legislatures, not courts, are best suited 
to make. In fact, deference to legislative judgment seems 
particularly appropriate here, where the judgment has been 
made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of 
local problems and insight into appropriate local 
solutions.105 
Not surprisingly then, Justice Scalia admitted that the Court 
would use more than rational basis review.106 Unlike Lawrence v. 
Texas,107 which was silent about the level of scrutiny to be used for 
the right to engage in consensual homosexual activity,108 Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion was explicit that the Court would use more 
than a reasonableness test in evaluating government regulation of 
firearms.109 He stated, “[i]f all that was required to overcome the right 
to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment 
would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on 
irrational laws, and would have no effect.”110 
Although much remains uncertain as to which gun laws will 
survive after Heller and McDonald, it is accurate to say that the 
Second Amendment is the only new right that the Court has 
recognized in the last thirty-five years when it has approved more 
than rational basis review. It is hardly coincidental that it is an area 
where conservative political ideology favors the right. As 
conservative federal appellate judges Richard Posner and J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III argued, the Court’s Second Amendment cases can be 
understood only as conservative judicial activism.111 
III.  BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS 
In Berguis v. Thompkins,112 the Supreme Court took a major step 
toward lessening the Constitution’s protection against self-
incrimination. The Supreme Court held that a criminal suspect’s 
 
 105. Id. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 626 n.27 (majority opinion). 
 107. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 n.27. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Wilkinson, supra note 94, at 254. 
 112. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
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silence, even for a period of hours, is not enough to invoke the right 
to remain silent.113 Even a single word after hours of silence is 
enough to waive this right.114 
In Miranda v. Arizona,115 the Supreme Court described the 
inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation and held that to 
lessen this coercion suspects must be informed of their rights.116 Even 
children can recite the famous Miranda warnings, which include 
informing a suspect of his or her right to remain silent. 
In Berguis v. Thompkins, Ohio police arrested the defendant, 
Van Chester Thompkins, on suspicion of having committed 
murder.117 He was given his Miranda warnings and asked to sign a 
statement that he understood them.118 He refused.119 There is a factual 
dispute as to whether he orally indicated his understanding.120 
Police officers questioned Thompkins for three hours.121 
Thompkins remained almost entirely silent during this time.122 
Occasionally he would answer a question with a single word or a 
nod.123 Almost two hours and forty-five minutes into the 
interrogation, the police officer asked Thompkins, “Do you believe 
in God?”124 Thompkins said, “Yes.”125 The officer then asked 
Thompkins whether he prays to God and once more he said, “Yes.”126 
The officer then asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for 
shooting that boy down?”127 Thompkins again said, “Yes.”128 
This statement was admitted against Thompkins at trial and was 
 
 113. See id. at 2259–60. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 116. Id. at 444–47. 
 117. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 2256–57. 
 124. Id. at 2257. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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crucial evidence in gaining his conviction.129 The issue before the 
Supreme Court was whether this violated the privilege against self-
incrimination.130 In a 5–4 decision, the Court ruled against 
Thompkins and found that his Fifth Amendment rights had not been 
infringed.131 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.132 
The Court concluded that a suspect’s silence is not sufficient to 
invoke the right to remain silent.133 Rather the Court said that there 
must be an “unambiguous” invocation of this right.134 Earlier, in 
Davis v. United States,135 the Supreme Court held that an invocation 
of the right to counsel under Miranda must be done in a clear and 
unambiguous manner.136 In Thompkins, the Court ruled that the same 
is true of the right to remain silent.137 
The Court then found that Thompkins had validly waived his 
right to remain silent.138 The Court said that the waiver of this right 
need not be explicit.139 It said that “[a]n ‘implicit waiver’ of the ‘right 
to remain silent’ is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into 
evidence.”140 From the majority’s perspective, Thompkins could have 
stayed silent.141 Once he spoke, he waived his right to remain silent 
under the Fifth Amendment.142 The Court thus upheld Thompkins’s 
conviction.143 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a vehement dissent joined by 
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.144 She accused the majority 
of turning Miranda on its head and lamented the irony that silence is 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2259. 
 131. Id. at 2263. 
 132. Id. at 2255. 
 133. Id. at 2259–60. 
 134. Id. at 2260. 
 135. 512 U.S. 452 (1994). 
 136. Id. at 459. 
 137. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
 138. Id. at 2262. 
 139. Id. at 2261. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 2265. 
 144. Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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not sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent.145 
It is impossible to reconcile the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Thompkins with Miranda. This is yet another example, and there 
have been many, of the Roberts Court’s lack of concern with 
precedent and stare decisis. In Miranda, the Court said that “[i]f [an] 
interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a 
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination . . . .”146 But in Thompkins, the 
Court said that the government need not show a knowing and 
intelligent waiver in order to find a suspect’s statements 
admissible.147 
In Miranda, the Court said: 
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to waiver of 
rights by an accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation or 
incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made is 
strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his 
rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual 
eventually made a statement is consistent with the 
conclusion that the compelling influence of the 
interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent 
with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the 
privilege.148 
Under this analysis, Thompkins’s incriminating statements should 
have been excluded. 
Nor is it consistent with the right to remain silent to hold that 
silence is insufficient and that a defendant must specifically say that 
he or she invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. Few 
suspects realistically will have the knowledge to recite these magic 
words. After Thompkins, police can continue to question a silent 
suspect for hours and hours until they finally obtain an incriminating 
 
 145. Id. at 2278. 
 146. 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
 147. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264 (ruling that “a suspect who has received and 
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to 
remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police,” and emphasizing that police need 
not obtain a waiver of Miranda rights before interrogating the suspect). 
 148. 384 U.S. at 476. 
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answer.149 
Miranda created a strong presumption that confessions are 
inadmissible if obtained after questioning unless there has been an 
explicit waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.150 In sharp contrast, Thompkins creates a strong 
presumption that confessions are admissible if obtained after 
questioning unless there has been an explicit invocation of the right 
to remain silent.151 This really does turn Miranda upside down. 
Ultimately, the underlying issue is whether Miranda matters. 
Miranda was based on great concern about the inherent coercion 
when suspects are subjected to in-custody police interrogation.152 The 
Supreme Court has explained that Miranda reflects our society’s 
“preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of 
criminal justice” and a “fear that self-incriminating statements will 
be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses.”153 It is based on a 
realization that while the privilege is “sometimes ‘a shelter to the 
guilty,’ [it] is often ‘a protection to the innocent.’”154 
In 2000, in Dickerson v. United States,155 the Court, in a 7–2 
decision, reaffirmed Miranda.156 But the Court’s decision in 
Thompkins shows the hollowness of this commitment. As Justice 
Sotomayor observed in her dissent, “Today’s decision bodes poorly 
for the fundamental principles that Miranda protects.”157 
Thompkins is not activist in the sense of overturning the 
decisions of popularly elected officials. But it is activist in changing 
the law from what it had been for the decades since Miranda and for 
ruling broadly when it could have decided narrowly. As Justice 
Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent, the Court could have narrowly 
ruled that relief was not available on habeas corpus.158 Instead, the 
 
 149. 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60. 
 150. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
 151. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60. 
 152. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448–49. 
 153. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n 
of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 156. Id. at 432. 
 157. 130 S. Ct. at 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 2274. 
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Court’s holding is broad and significantly limits the protections 
created by Miranda.159 
IV.  THE TRANSFORMATION OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 
The Court decided each of these cases 5–4 with the same 
justices in the majorities and the dissents.160 The issues were 
completely different and totally unrelated to one another. Yet, in 
each case there was a clear conservative—as opposed to liberal—
position, and the Court split exactly along these lines.161 
The conservatism of October Term 2009 is quite different from 
the conservatism of twenty years ago, which far more emphasized 
majoritarianism and deference to the elected branches of 
government. In describing October Term 1988, I wrote: 
If a jurisprudential theme can be identified, it is the Court’s 
search for judicial neutrality. Expressing a desire to defer to 
legislative and executive decisionmaking, the Court 
frequently declared that it would hold government actions 
unconstitutional only when guided by clearly established 
constitutional principles that exist entirely apart from the 
preferences of the Justices.162 
I noted that “the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence is privative—
defined not positively, but negatively. The Court is animated not by 
an affirmative view of the Court’s role or of constitutional values to 
be upheld, but rather by a vision of the bounds of judicial 
behavior.”163 The result I worried about was that 
the approach is leading to a vanishing Constitution. Fewer 
clauses of the Constitution, whether dealing with the 
structure of government or with individual liberties, are 
being enforced. Majoritarianism is a jealous philosophy that 
tolerates little judicial review. If judges can intervene only 
 
 159. See id. at 2278. 
 160. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3020, 3024 (2010); Berghuis v. 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 572 
(2008). 
 161. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical 
Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 788 (2009). 
 162. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 48–49 (footnote omitted). 
 163. Id. at 49. 
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when there are clear “objective” standards, wholly apart 
from the views of the individual Justices, judicial review 
will serve primarily to uphold and legitimate legislative and 
executive decisions.164 
Cases like Citizens United, Heller, and McDonald show that the 
Roberts Court of 2009–2010 is quite different than the Rehnquist 
Court of 1988–1989 in its deference to majoritarian decision making. 
What accounts for this shift and what is it likely to mean for 
constitutional law, at least in the immediate future? 
Most obviously, there is a more solid conservative majority 
today than there was twenty years ago. The conservative majority 
then comprised Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.165 
Rehnquist and Scalia were the most consistently conservative of 
these five justices.166 Today, four justices are that conservative: 
Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.167 Never since 1937 have there 
been four justices this conservative at the same time on the Supreme 
Court.168 Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have been 
everything that conservatives could have hoped for and that liberals 
could have feared. Whereas in 1988–1989, Justice O’Connor or 
Justice White would have been regarded as the swing justice, now it 
is Justice Kennedy.169 He is significantly more conservative than 
Justice O’Connor was on issues such as campaign finance, abortion, 
separation of church and state, and affirmative action.170 
But it is not just that a more solid conservative majority will be 
emboldened to more aggressively pursue a conservative agenda. 
There has been a shift in the approach to judicial review. The 
conservatism of twenty years ago was fashioned as a response to the 
Warren Court and especially to Roe v. Wade.171 An emphasis on 
judicial deference was seen as the antidote to the Warren Court’s 
 
 164. Id. at 47. 
 165. See id. at 44–45. 
 166. Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1040, 1071–72 (2006). 
 167. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 788. 
 168. Id. at 782. 
 169. See, e.g., Douglas M. Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter and His Critics, 11 
GREEN BAG 2D 317 (2009). 
 170. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 782. 
 171. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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activism and to the Court’s invalidation of abortion laws that existed 
in forty-six states.172 
The Warren Court ended in 1969 and Roe was decided four 
years later.173 John Roberts was fourteen in 1969 and eighteen in 
1973.174 His conservatism was forged during the Reagan era, not the 
Nixon years.175 Over time, conservatives have fashioned their own 
areas in which they want an aggressive judiciary overturning the 
choices of majoritarian decision making; campaign finance laws and 
gun laws are examples of this. 
A crucial transition in judicial conservatism occurred in the 
1990s with the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions. In a series of 
rulings, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power,176 revived the Tenth Amendment as a limit on 
federal power,177 and limited Congress’s authority to legislate under 
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.178 No longer was judicial 
conservatism about deference to the political branches. For the first 
time in sixty years, the Court struck down federal laws on federalism 
grounds.179 
To be clear, I do not suggest that conservative justices are more 
activist than liberal ones. My point is that for a period of time 
 
 172. KENNETH DAUTRICH & DAVID A. YALOF, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL, 
POPULAR & GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, BRIEF EDITION 249 (2009). 
 173. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. 
 174. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (stating that John Roberts 
was born on January 27, 1955) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 175. See, e.g., John Roberts—Reagan Era Documents Speak to School Prayer and Abortion, 
AMERICAN CENTER FOR LAW & JUSTICE, http://www.aclj.org/Issues/Resources/Document.aspx? 
ID=1812 (“John Roberts advised the White House to support congressional efforts to allow 
school prayer.”) (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun Free School 
Zone Act as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce clause power); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil damages provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act as exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce clause power). 
 177. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a provision of the 
Brady Handgun Control Act, which required state and local law enforcement personnel to do 
background checks before issuing permits for firearms); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992) (invalidating a provision of a federal law requiring state and local governments to clean up 
their nuclear waste). 
 178. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (declaring the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments). 
 179. I have criticized these decisions in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: 
FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 68–71, 75–85 (2008). 
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judicial conservatism strongly emphasized deference to majoritarian 
decision making. However, this began to fade in the 1990s as the 
conservative majority grew and the conservative justices asserted 
their own agenda. The legacy last term was cases like Citizens 
United and McDonald. 
What will this mean when some of the most controversial 
constitutional issues of our time come before the Supreme Court? 
How will the Court handle the constitutionality of the mandate that 
individuals purchase health insurance or pay a monthly sum via their 
taxes?180 Will the Court defer to Congress and the president? How 
will the Court deal with the constitutionality of Arizona’s Senate Bill 
1070, which requires state and local law enforcement personnel to 
enforce federal immigration laws?181 Will the Court follow precedent 
and find that the bill is preempted by the federal government’s 
exclusive control over immigration or will it follow conservative 
ideology and uphold the Arizona law?182 These cases, perhaps even 
more than the ones during October Term 2009, will reveal the 
ideology of the Roberts Court and how much it is a conservative 
activist Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The most important development during October Term 2009 
was not in any decision and is not reflected on the docket sheets for 
the year. It occurred when Justice John Paul Stevens announced his 
retirement from the Court at age ninety after thirty-five years. His 
departure will make an enormous difference, in ways large and 
small, readily apparent and subtle. 
For lawyers who appear before the Court, his avuncular 
presence will be missed. I argued several cases before the Court with 
Justice Stevens there and observed many more. I was always struck 
 
 180. The lower courts are split as to the constitutionality of this provision. See 
Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinella v. Sebelius, 2010 WL 5059718 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2010); 
Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 7, 2010); Baldwin v. 
Sebelius, No. 10CV1033, 2010 WL 3418436 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010). 
 181. S. 1070, 49 Leg. 2nd Reg. Sess. (AZ 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/ 
49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf. 
 182. A federal district court has issued a preliminary injunction against the most important 
provisions of the law on preemption grounds. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 
980–91 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
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by his decency to all, including both the most famous lawyers and 
those struggling in their first appearances. I have also seen more than 
one lawyer get devastated by Justice Stevens’ gentle, but incisive, 
questioning. 
Justice Stevens brought a wealth of life and judicial experience 
to the bench. He is the last justice who will have ever served during 
World War II. He is one of the last who grew up during the Great 
Depression. He is the last to have served on the Burger Court and 
was the bridge from the great liberals like Justices Brennan and 
Marshall to the present. 
In a more direct way, his absence will matter greatly in who 
writes which opinions. When the chief justice is in the majority, he 
assigns who writes for the Court. But when the chief justice is in the 
dissent, the most senior associate justice assigns the majority 
opinion. Last year, when Justice Kennedy joined with Justices 
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Stevens assigned 
the majority opinion. Now, if Justice Kennedy joins with Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Kennedy will 
assign the majority opinion. 
In his next-to-the-last day on the Court, June 28, 2010, in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy 
dissent defending his view of a “living Constitution” and disagreeing 
with those who believe that the Constitution’s meaning is limited to 
its original understanding.183 This, too, is part of his remarkable 
legacy to constitutional law. 
 
 183. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3088–3136 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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